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Abstract
We present a general existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games. We
consider nonzero-sum normal-form games with an arbitrary number of players and arbitrary
action spaces. We impose merely one condition: the payoff function of each player is bounded.
We allow players to use finitely additive probability measures as mixed strategies.
Since we do not assume any measurability conditions, for a given strategy profile the
expected payoff is generally not uniquely defined, and integration theory only provides an
upper bound, the upper integral, and a lower bound, the lower integral. A strategy profile
is called a justifiable equilibrium if each player evaluates this profile by the upper integral,
and each player evaluates all his possible deviations by the lower integral. We show that a
justifiable equilibrium always exists.
Our equilibrium concept and existence result are motivated by Vasquez (2017), who defines
a conceptually related equilibrium notion, and shows its existence under the conditions of
finitely many players, separable metric action spaces and bounded Borel measurable payoff
functions. Our proof borrows several ideas from Vasquez (2017), but is more direct as it does
not make use of countably additive representations of finitely additive measures by Yosida
and Hewitt (1952).
1 Introduction
The model and main result. The main goal of the current paper is to present a general
existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games, with an arbitrary number of
players and arbitrary action spaces. The only condition we impose is that the payoff function of
each player is bounded. We allow players to use finitely additive probability measures as mixed
strategies.
Since we do not pose any measurability assumptions, the payoff function of a player is not neces-
sarily integrable. That is, a strategy profile does not always induce a unique expected payoff. In
that case, the upper integral, i.e. the upper approximations of the integral by simple functions, is
not the same as the lower integral, i.e. lower approximations of the integral by simple functions. So
based on integration theory, the upper integral could be interpreted as the best possible expected
payoff, while the lower integral as the worst expected payoff.
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We call a strategy profile a justifiable equilibrium if each player evaluates this strategy profile
by the upper integral, and each player evaluates all his possible deviations by the lower integral.
Our equilibrium concept is motivated by the concept of optimistic equilibrium in Vasquez (2017).
The concept of justifiable equilibrium has two main conceptual advantages. First, the definition is
straightforward and has an easy interpretation. Second, we only need to approximate the integral
of the payoff functions at the strategy profiles under consideration. This is in stark contrast with
optimistic equilibrium in Vasquez (2017), which is defined through several abstract steps and
makes use of small perturbations of each strategy profile. Admittedly, both concepts have one
drawback: a strategy profile is not necessarily evaluated in the same way when it is a candidate
equilibrium and when it arises by a deviation of a player.
Our main result is that a justifiable equilibrium always exists, in any normal-form game with
bounded payoff functions. The proof uses the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem. Our
proof borrows several ideas from Vasquez (2017), but is more direct as it does not make use
of countably additive representations of finitely additive measures (comment 4.5 in Yosida and
Hewitt (1952)).
Related literature. Finite additivity, instead of countable additivity, for probability measures
was argued for on several grounds. For example, in decision theory conceptual arguments were
given by de Finetti (1975), Savage (1942), and Dubins and Savage (2014). For a comparison
between finitely additive and countably additive measures, see Bingham (2010).
In game theory, countable additivity is the usual assumption on probability measures. However,
equilibria in finitely additive strategies have also gained recognition. Marinacci (1997) proves the
existence of Nash equilibrium in nonzero-sum normal-form games, when the payoff functions are
integrable. In this case, the lower and upper integrals coincide, and hence our result can be seen as
a vast generalization of the existence result in Marinacci (1997). In a strongly related work Harris
et al (2005) give different types of characterizations of the utility functions that Marinacci (1997)
considers. In a different vain, Capraro and Scarsini (2013) consider some nonzero-sum games where
the upper and lower integrals of utility functions do not coincide. They calculate expected payoffs
through convex combinations of different orders of integration, and prove the existence of Nash
equilibrium when the game has countable action spaces and can be defined through an algebraic
operator. They extend their result to uncountable action spaces by adding further restrictions
on the payoff functions. Generally speaking, the existence of finitely additive Nash equilibrium
in normal-form games seems to require fairly restrictive assumptions on the payoff functions, but
sometimes also on the action spaces.
There are various results on the existence of the value and optimal strategies in zero-sum games, see
for instance Yanovskaya (1970), Heath and Sudderth (1972), Kindler (1983), Maitra and Sudderth
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(1993), Schervish and Seidenfeld (1996), Maitra and Sudderth (1998), and Flesch et al (2017). For
an extensive overview we refer to Flesch et al (2017).
What all the above mentioned papers have in common is that either each strategy profile induces
a unique expected payoff or each strategy profile is assigned a certain expected payoff according
to some rule. Then, Nash equilibrium can be defined in the usual way by requiring that each
player’s strategy is a best response to the strategies of his opponents. In this sense, our definition
of justifiable equilibrium and the notion of optimistic equilibrium in Vasquez (2017) conceptually
separate themselves from the literature and take a somewhat new direction. Indeed, as mentioned
earlier, both concepts assign to a strategy profile a possibly different payoff when it is a candidate
equilibrium and when it arises by a deviation of a player. We discuss later in Section 5 whether
our proof and existence result could be extended to a Nash equilibrium, that is when each strat-
egy profile is assigned the same expected payoff, irrespective of it being considered a candidate
equilibrium or not.
Justifiable equilibrium uses the upper integral and the lower integral, when the payoff function
is not integrable. The use of the upper and lower integrals is of course not a new idea, see
for example Lehrer (2009) who uses the upper integral for the definition of a new integral for
capacities, and Stinchcombe (2005) where the upper and lower integrals appear in the context of
set-valued integrals.
Structure of the paper. In the next section we discuss some technical preliminaries on
finitely additive probability measures. We present the model and the main existence result in
Section 3. We provide the proof in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we demonstrate the difficulties
of improving upon this existence result.
2 Preliminaries
Charges. Take a nonempty set X endowed with an algebra F(X). A finitely additive probability
measure, or simply charge, on (X,F(X)) is a mapping µ : F(X)→ [0, 1] such that µ(X) = 1 and
for all disjoint sets E,F ∈ F(X) it holds that µ(E ∪ F ) = µ(E) + µ(F ).
Product charge. Let I be a nonempty set, and for each i let Xi be a nonempty set endowed
with an algebra F(Xi), and let µi be a charge on (Xi,F(Xi)). Let X = ×i∈IXi. A rectangle of
X is a set of the form Y = ×i∈IYi, where Yi ∈ F(Xi) for all i ∈ I and moreover Yi = Xi for all
but finitely many i ∈ I. Let F(X) be the smallest algebra on X containing the rectangles of X,
which is identical to the collection of all finite unions of rectangles of X. It is known that there
is a unique charge µ on (X,F(X)), called the product charge, that assigns probability Πi∈Iµi(Yi)
to each rectangle ×i∈IYi of X.
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Integration with respect to a charge. We call a function s : X → R an F(X)-measurable
simple function if s is of the form s =
∑k
m=1 cmIBm , where c1, . . . , ck ∈ R, the sets B1, . . . , Bk are
rectangles of X and form a partition of X, and IBm is the characteristic function of the set Bm.
With respect to a charge µ on (X,F(X)), the integral of s is defined by s(µ) = ∫
x∈X s(x) µ(dx) =∑k
m=1 cm · µ(Bm).
Consider a bounded function u : X → R. The upper integral of u with respect to µ is defined as
u(µ) = inf
{∫
x∈X
s(x) µ(dx) : s ≥ u, s is an F(X)-measurable simple function
}
,
and the lower integral of u with respect to µ as
u(µ) = sup
{∫
x∈X
s(x) µ(dx) : s ≤ u, s is an F(X)-measurable simple function
}
.
3 The model and the main result
A game has an arbitrary nonempty set I of players. Each player i ∈ I is given an arbitrary
nonempty action space Ai, endowed with an algebra F(Ai). Let A = Πi∈IAi. Each player i ∈ I
is given an arbitrary bounded payoff function ui : A→ R.
A strategy for player i ∈ I is a charge σi on (Ai,F(Ai)). We denote the set of strategies for player
i by Σi. A strategy profile is a collection of strategies σ = (σi)i∈I , where σi is a strategy for each
player i ∈ I. We denote the set of strategy profiles by Σ. Let σ−i denote the partial strategy
profile (σj)j∈I\{i} of the opponents of player i, and Σ−i denote the set of such partial strategy
profiles.
As described in Section 2, every strategy profile σ generates a unique charge on (A,F(A)), which
with a small abuse of notation we also denote by σ. For a player i ∈ I the upper integral of his
payoff function is denoted by ui, and the lower integral of his payoff function is denoted by ui.
Definition 1. A strategy profile σ is called a justifiable equilibrium if for each player i ∈ I and
each strategy τi ∈ Σi
ui(σ) ≥ ui(τi, σ−i).
Intuitively, at a justifiable equilibrium profile σ, each player’s best possible expected payoff should
be greater than or equal to his worst possible expected payoff if he deviates. Our main result is
the following.
Theorem 2. Every game with bounded payoff functions has a justifiable equilibrium.
Note that we have no restriction on the number of players and the action spaces. The proof is
based on the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem.
The game in the following example does not admit a Nash equilibrium in countably additive
strategies. However, it has a justifiable equilibrium.
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Example 1. The following game is a version of Wald’s game (Wald (1945)). The action sets are
A1 = A2 = N, endowed with the algebra 2N. Player 1’s payoff for (a1, a2) ∈ N×N is u1(a1, a2) = 1
if a1 ≥ a2 and u1(a1, a2) = 0 if a1 < a2. Player 2’s payoff is u2(a1, a2) = 1 − u1(a1, a2) for all
(a1, a2) ∈ N×N. The payoffs given by u = (u1, u2) are represented in the following matrix, where
player 1 is the row player and player 2 is the column player.
u 1 2 3 . . .
1 1,0 0,1 0,1 . . .
2 1,0 1,0 0,1 . . .
3 1,0 1,0 1,0 . . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
1. This game has no Nash equilibrium in countably additive strategies. Indeed, take any strategy
profile σ = (σ1, σ2). Since the sum of the expected payoffs is 1, we can assume without loss of
generality that u1(σ) ≤ 1/2. However, against the strategy σ2, player 1 can obtain an expected
payoff arbitrarily close to 1 by choosing a large action a1 ∈ N. Hence, σ cannot be a Nash
equilibrium.
2. There is a justifiable equilibrium in this game. A strategy σi for player i ∈ {1, 2} is called
diffuse if σi(n) = 0 for every n ∈ N. Indeed, each strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) in which at least
one of the strategies is diffuse, is a justifiable equilibrium.
We show that σ is a justifiable equilibrium if σ1 is diffuse; the proof is similar when σ2 is diffuse.
Because the payoff functions only take values 0 and 1, by the definition of justifiable equilibrium,
it suffices to prove that u1(σ) = 1 and u2(σ1, σ
′
2) = 0 for every strategy σ
′
2 for player 2.
2.1 We show first that u1(σ) = 1. As before, F(N × N) is the collection of all finite unions of
rectangles of N × N. Take any F(N × N)-measurable simple function s : N × N → R such that
s ≥ u1. Assume that s is of the form s =
∑k
m=1 cmIBm , where c1, . . . , ck ∈ R and the sets
B1, . . . , Bk are rectangles of N× N and form a partition of N× N.
Let M be the set of m for which σ(Bm) > 0. Note that
∑
m∈M σ(Bm) = 1, since B1, . . . , Bk
form a finite partition of N × N. Let m ∈ M . Since σ1 is diffuse, the set Bm is of the form
Bm = B
1
m × B2m where B1m ⊆ N is infinite. This implies that there is (x1m, x2m) ∈ Bm such that
x1m ≥ x2m. Consequently, cm ≥ u1(x1m, x2m) = 1. Therefore,
s(σ) =
k∑
m=1
cm · σ(Bm) =
∑
m∈M
cm · σ(Bm) ≥
∑
m∈M
σ(Bm) = 1.
It follows that u1(σ) = 1.
2.2 We show that u2(σ1, σ
′
2) = 0 for every strategy σ
′
2 for player 2. Let σ
′
2 be any strategy of player
2. Take any F(N× N)-measurable simple function s : N× N → R such that s ≤ u2. Similarly to
5
step 2.1, one can verify that
s(σ1, σ
′
2) ≤ 0.
It follows that u2(σ1, σ
′
2) = 0. ♦
We remark that in the special class of games where the lower integral and the upper integral of
the payoff functions coincide, that is ui(σ) = ui(σ) for every strategy profile σ and every player i,
the concepts of justifiable equilibrium and Nash equilibrium coincide. Hence, in view of Theorem
2, these games admit a Nash equilibrium. The existence of Nash equilibrium in these games was
shown earlier in Marinacci (1997).
4 Proof of the existence result
In this section we prove Theorem 2. The proof is based on the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed
point theorem, stated below (cf. Corollary 17.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2005)).
Theorem 3 (Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg). Let K be a nonempty compact convex subset of a locally
convex Hausdorff topological vector space, and let the correspondence φ : K ⇒ K have closed graph
and nonempty convex values. Then the set of fixed points of φ is nonempty.
We endow Σ with the topology of pointwise convergence. That is, we see Σ as a subset of
C := ×i∈I×A′i∈F(Ai) R, where C is endowed with the product topology and Σ is given its relative
topology. By Tychonoff’s theorem, C[0,1] := ×i∈I ×A′i∈F(Ai) [0, 1] is a compact subset of C. As
Σ is a closed subset of C[0,1], the set Σ is compact. This way Σ is a nonempty compact convex
subset of the locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space C.
A mapping f : Σ → R is called upper semicontinuous if for every net (σα)α∈D in Σ, where D is
a directed set, converging to some σ ∈ Σ, we have lim supα f(σα) ≤ f(σ). Similarly, a mapping
f : Σ→ R is called lower semicontinuous if for every net (σα)α∈D in Σ, where D is a directed set,
converging to some σ ∈ Σ, we have lim infα f(σα) ≥ f(σ).
Lemma 4. For every player i ∈ I, the mapping σ → ui(σ) from Σ to R is upper semicontinuous,
and the mapping σ → ui(σ) from Σ to R is lower semicontinuous.
Proof. We only prove that the mapping σ → ui(σ) from Σ to R is upper semicontinuous. The
proof of the second part is similar.
Take a net (σα)α∈D in Σ, where D is a directed set, converging to some σ ∈ Σ.
First we show that limα s(σ
α) = s(σ) for every F(A)-measurable simple function s. Take an
F(A)-measurable simple function s of the form s = ∑km=1 cmIBm . Since each Bm is a rectangle
of A, the net (σα(Bm))α∈D of probabilities converges to σ(Bm). Therefore limα s(σα) = s(σ).
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Let ε > 0. By the definition of ui(σ), there is an F(A)-measurable simple function s such that
s ≥ ui and
ui(σ) ≥ s(σ)− ε.
Since s is an F(A)-measurable simple function, we have by the argument above that limα s(σα) =
s(σ). Because s ≥ ui, we also have s(σα) ≥ ui(σα) for each α ∈ D. Hence
ui(σ) ≥ s(σ)− ε = lim
α
s(σα)− ε ≥ lim sup
α
ui(σ
α)− ε.
As ε > 0 was arbitrary the proof is complete.
Now we prove Theorem 2 in a number of steps. We will define a correspondence from the set of
strategy profiles Σ to the power set of Σ such that this correspondence has a fixed point, by the
Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg theorem, and each fixed point is a justifiable equilibrium. To define this
correspondence we need a number of auxiliary steps. Some of these steps are fairly similar to steps
taken by Vasquez (2017).
Step 1. Consider a player i and let γi be a strategy for player i. For each strategy profile σ, we
define the set
BRγii (σ) = {τ ∈ Σ : ui(τi, σ−i) ≥ ui(γi, σ−i)} .
Note that BRγii is a subset of Σ and not of Σi. It is not essential for the proof to define BR
γi
i
as a set of strategy profiles, however it makes the exposition somewhat simpler. Intuitively, BRγii
consists of all strategy profiles τ such that τi with the upper integral is a better reply to σ−i than
γi with the lower integral. If a strategy profile τ belongs to BR
γi
i , then (τi, τ
′
−i) also belongs to
BRγii for every τ
′
−i ∈ Σ−i.
We show that for each strategy profile σ, the set BRγii (σ) is nonempty and convex.
Proof of step 1.
Take a strategy profile σ. Since (γi, σ−i) ∈ BRγii (σ), the set BRγii (σ) is nonempty.
We show that BRγii (σ) is convex. As a first step, we argue that ui is linear in the strategy of
player i. Take two strategy profiles τ, µ ∈ Σ such that τ−i = µ−i and λ ∈ (0, 1). We prove that
ui(λ · τ + (1− λ) · µ) = λ · ui(τ) + (1− λ) · ui(µ). (1)
Let Si denote the set of F(A)-measurable simple functions s satisfying s ≥ ui. Clearly, for every
s ∈ Si we have
s(λ · τ + (1− λ) · µ) = λ · s(τ) + (1− λ) · s(µ).
Hence,
inf
s∈Si
s(λ · τ + (1− λ) · µ) = inf
s∈Si
[λ · s(τ) + (1− λ) · s(µ)]
≥ λ · inf
s∈Si
s(τ) + (1− λ) · inf
s∈Si
s(µ). (2)
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Let ε > 0, and let s′, s′′ ∈ Si such that
s′(τ) ≤ inf
s∈Si
s(τ) + ε and s′′(µ) ≤ inf
s∈Si
s(µ) + ε.
Define s′′′ = min{s′, s′′}. Clearly, s′′′ ∈ Si. Thus
λ · inf
s∈Si
s(τ) + (1− λ) · inf
s∈Si
s(µ) ≥ λ · s′(τ) + (1− λ) · s′′(µ)− ε
≥ λ · s′′′(τ) + (1− λ) · s′′′(µ)− ε
= s′′′(λ · τ + (1− λ) · µ)− ε
≥ inf
s∈Si
s(λ · τ + (1− λ) · µ)− ε.
As ε > 0 was arbitrary, we conclude
λ · inf
s∈Si
s(τ) + (1− λ) · inf
s∈Si
s(µ) ≥ inf
s∈Si
s(λ · τ + (1− λ) · µ). (3)
By (2) and (3), we have shown
inf
s∈Si
s(λ · τ + (1− λ) · µ) = λ · inf
s∈Si
s(τ) + (1− λ) · inf
s∈Si
s(µ).
Hence, (1) holds, which shows that ui is linear in the strategy of player i.
Take two strategy profiles τ, µ ∈ BRγii (σ) and λ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
ui(λ · τi + (1− λ) · µi, σ−i) = λ · ui(τi, σ−i) + (1− λ) · ui(µi, σ−i) ≥ ui(γi, σ−i).
As a consequence, BRγii (σ) is convex.
Step 2. Consider a player i and let γi be a strategy for player i. We prove that the correspondence
σ ⇒ BRγii (σ) from Σ to 2Σ has a closed graph.
Proof of step 2. With a directed set D, take two nets (σα)α∈D and (τα)α∈D in Σ converging to
respectively some σ ∈ Σ and τ ∈ Σ. Assume that for every α ∈ D, we have τα ∈ BRγii (σα). We
show that τ ∈ BRγii (σ). Then, the proof of step 2 will be complete (cf. also Theorems 17.16 and
17.10 in Aliprantis and Border (2005)).
For every α ∈ D, as τα ∈ BRγii (σα), we have ui(ταi , σα−i) ≥ ui(γi, σα−i). By Lemma 4, taking
limits yields
ui(τi, σ−i) ≥ lim sup
α
ui(τ
α
i , σ
α
−i) ≥ lim inf
α
ui(γi, σ
α
−i) ≥ ui(γi, σ−i).
Thus, τ ∈ BRγii (σ) as desired.
Step 3. Consider a player i. For each strategy profile σ, we define the set
BRi(σ) =
⋂
γi∈Σi
BRγii (σ).
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Intuitively, BRi consists of all strategy profiles τ such that τi with the upper integral is a better
reply to σ−i than any other strategy of player i with the lower integral. We prove that for each
strategy profile σ, the set BRi(σ) is nonempty and convex.
Proof of step 3. Take σ ∈ Σ. Convexity of BRi(σ) directly follows from Step 1, where we
showed the convexity of BRγii (σ) for each γi ∈ Σi.
Now we show that BRi(σ) is nonempty. By the finite intersection property (cf. Theorem 2.31 in
Aliprantis and Border (2005)) it is sufficient to check for finitely many strategies γ1i , . . . , γ
k
i ∈ Σi
that ∩kj=1BRγ
j
i
i (σ) is not empty. Choose m ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that ui(γmi , σ−i) ≥ ui(γji , σ−i) for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since ui(γmi , σ−i) ≥ ui(γmi , σ−i), the strategy profile (γmi , σ−i) belongs to
∩kj=1BRγ
j
i
i (σ). So BRi(σ) is nonempty.
Step 4. For each strategy profile σ, we define the set
BR(σ) =
⋂
i∈I
BRi(σ).
Intuitively, BR(σ) consists of all strategy profiles τ such that, for any player i, the strategy τi
with the upper integral is a better reply to σ−i than any other strategy of player i with the lower
integral. We prove that for each strategy profile σ, the set BR(σ) is nonempty and convex.
Proof of step 4. Take σ ∈ Σ. Convexity of BR(σ) directly follows from Step 3, where we showed
the convexity of BRi(σ) for each i ∈ I.
Now we show that BR(σ) is nonempty. By Step 3, BRi(σ) is nonempty for each player i ∈ I.
Choose a strategy profile τ i ∈ BRi(σ) for each player i ∈ I. As usual, τ ii denotes the strategy of
player i in the strategy profile τ i. Construct a new strategy profile τ such that τi = τ
i
i for each
player i ∈ I. Then τ ∈ BRi(σ) for all i ∈ I. This implies that τ ∈ ∩i∈IBRi(σ), and hence BR(σ)
is nonempty.
Step 5. We argue that the correspondence φ : σ ⇒ BR(σ) from Σ to 2Σ has a fixed point.
Moreover, any fixed point of φ is a justifiable equilibrium.
Proof of step 5. The graph of the correspondence φ is the intersection of the graphs of the
correspondences σ ⇒ BRγii (σ) over all players i ∈ I and strategies γi of player i. Hence, by Step
2, the correspondence φ has a closed graph. Moreover, by Step 4, φ has nonempty and convex
values. Due to Theorem 3 the correspondence φ has a fixed point. It is clear that any fixed point
of φ is a justifiable equilibrium.
5 Attempts to refine the concept of justifiable equilibrium
The concept of justifiable equilibrium has a straightforward definition, and importantly, as shown
in Theorem 2, it always exists in games with bounded payoff functions, regardless the number
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of players and the action spaces. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the difficulty to
find any refinement of the concept of justifiable equilibrium for which the general existence is
preserved, or at least guaranteed by arguments along the proof in Section 4.
In the first part of this section we examine whether the current proof could be generalised to
obtain a Nash equilibrium. That is, we would like to assign one specific payoff to each strategy
profile regardless whether it is a candidate equilibrium or it arises as a deviation.
In the second part of the section we investigate a possible refinement of justifiable equilibrium
where instead of the lower integral we take a higher, and therefore more restrictive mapping that
assigns an expected payoff to each strategy profile.
I. One natural attempt would be to take, for each player i ∈ I, a selector fi of the correspondence
σ ⇒ [ui(σ), ui(σ)] from Σ to R, try to replace both ui and ui by fi in the proof, and thus find
a strategy profile σ∗ such that fi(σ∗) ≥ fi(σ′i, σ∗−i) for every payer i and every strategy σ′i of
player i. So, this strategy profile σ∗ would not only be a justifiable equilibrium, but even a Nash
equilibrium with respect to the payoffs given by f = (fi)i∈I .
Since we try to replace both ui and ui by fi in the proof, this approach would only work if the
selector fi, for each player i, satisfies those properties of both ui and ui that we used in the proof
of Section 4. To be precise, in that proof we made use of the following properties of ui and ui for
each player i: (1) ui(σ) ≤ ui(σ) for every strategy profile σ, (2) the mapping σ → ui(σ) is lower
semicontinuous (cf. Lemma 4), (3) the mapping σ → ui(σ) is upper semicontinuous (cf. Lemma
4) and it is linear in player i’s strategy σi (cf. Step 1 in Section 4). Even though the mapping
σ → ui(σ) is also linear in player i’s strategy σi, this was not needed in the proof.
So, for each player i, the selector fi should be continuous and in addition linear in player i’s
strategy. However, in general, such a selector does not exist. In fact, not even a selector that is
only required to be continuous. We illustrate it by showing that there is no continuous selector for
player 1 in the game of Example 1. Let σ = (σ1, σ2) be a strategy profile in which both strategies
are diffuse charges, that is σ1(n) = σ2(n) = 0 for every n ∈ N, and both strategies are 0–1 valued,
that is they only assign to each set probability 0 or 1 (such strategies correspond to ultrafilters on
the action sets).
Consider any open neighborhood U of σ in Σ. Then, there is a finite collection {B1, . . . , Bk} of
rectangles of A = A1 ×A2 = N× N and positive numbers ε1, . . . , εk such that the set
W = {τ ∈ Σ : |τ(Bm)− σ(Bm)| < εm ∀m = 1, . . . , k}
is a subset of U . By adding more constraints (splitting the sets B1, . . . , Bk if necessary and adding
more sets), we can even assume that there is a finite partition P1 of A1 and a finite partition P2
of A2 such that {B1, . . . , Bk} is the same as {X × Y : X ∈ P1, Y ∈ P2}.
Let X be the unique element of P1 for which σ1(X) = 1, and let Y be the unique element of P2
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for which σ2(Y ) = 1. Since σ1 and σ2 are diffuse, X and Y are both infinite. This implies that
there are (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ X × Y such that x1 ≥ y1 and x2 < y2.
So we define two strategy profiles µ = δ(x1, y1) and ν = δ(x2, y2) where δ is the Dirac measure.
We have µ(X × Y ) = ν(X × Y ) = 1, and µ(Bm) = ν(Bm) = σ(Bm) for all m = 1, . . . , k. Hence
µ, ν ∈W . As u1(µ) = 1 and u1(ν) = 0, in conclusion, there is no continuous selector f1 for player
1 of the correspondence σ ⇒ [u1(σ), u1(σ)] from Σ to R.
II. A second, and probably less important, attempt to refine the concept of justifiable equilibrium
would be the following. As mentioned above, in the proof we only used for each player i the
following properties of the lower integral ui: ui ≤ ui and ui is lower semicontinuous. This brings
up the idea to consider the largest function gi : Σ → R such that gi ≤ ui and gi is lower
semicontinuous. This function gi is called the lower semicontinuous envelope of the function
ui. Clearly, ui ≤ gi. The question is thus whether gi coincides with ui. We suspect that the
answer is affirmative, meaning that replacing ui with gi does not lead to a refinement of justifiable
equilibrium. For the equality gi = ui, if true, it would suffice to show that for each strategy profile
σ, each open neighborhood U of σ and each ε > 0, there is a strategy profile τ ∈ U such that
ui(σ) ≥ ui(τ) − ε. Since ui(σ) can be approximated with an integral s(σ) with respect to an
F(A)-measurable simple function s ≤ ui, it would be enough to find a strategy profile τ ∈ U such
that s(σ) ≥ ui(τ) − ε. Note that U also contains strategy profiles µ = (µi)i∈I such that each
player i’s strategy µi is a convex combination of Dirac measures on actions in Ai (i.e. µi has finite
range in Ai), and for such strategy profiles µ the upper integral ui(µ) coincides with the lower
integral ui(µ), which we can denote by ui(µ). Hence, to show that gi = ui, it would also suffice
to find such a strategy profile µ ∈ U with s(σ) ≥ ui(µ)− ε. It is an interesting question whether
it is possible to find such a µ, based on σ and s.
6 Conclusions
Under rather general conditions we prove the existence of a justifiable equilibrium in finitely
additive strategies. Namely, a justifiable equilibrium exists in any normal-form game with an
arbitrary number of players and arbitrary action spaces, provided that the payoff functions are
bounded. The proof uses the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem. It seems difficult to
find a refinement of justifiable equilibrium for which the existence can be guaranteed while using
a similar line of proof.
References
Aliprantis, D and Border, KC (2005) Infinite Dimensional Analysis. Springer, Berlin.
11
Bingham, NH (2010) Finite additivity versus countable additivity, Electronic Journ@l for History
of Probability and Statistics, Vol 6, No 1.
Capraro, V and Scarsini, M (2013) Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic
approach, Games and Economic Behavior, 79, issue C, 163-180.
Dubins, LE and Savage, LJ, edited and updated by Sudderth, WD and Gilat, D (2014): How to
gamble if you must: inequalities for stochastic processes. Dover Publications, New York.
de Finetti, B (1975) The theory of probability (2 volumes). J. Wiley and Sons, Chichester.
Flesch, J, Vermeulen, D, and Zseleva, A (2017) Zero-sum games with charges. Games and Economic
Behavior, 102, 666-686.
Harris, JH, Stinchcombe, MB, and Zame, WR (2005) Nearly compact and continuous normal
form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence, Games and Economic Behavior, 50,
208-224.
Heath, D and Sudderth, W (1972) On a Theorem of de Finetti, oddsmaking and game theory,
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 43, 2072-2077.
Kindler, J (1983) A general solution concept for two-person zero sum games, J. Optimization
Theory and Applications 40, 105-119.
Lehrer, E (2009) A new integral for capacities, Economic Theory 39, 157-176
Maitra, A and Sudderth, W (1993) Finitely additive and measurable stochastic games. Interna-
tional Journal Game Theory 22, 201-223.
Maitra, A and Sudderth, W (1998) Finitely additive stochastic games with Borel measurable
payoffs. International Journal Game Theory 27, 257-267.
Marinacci, M (1997) Finitely additive and epsilon Nash equilibria, International Journal of Game
Theory, 26, issue 3, 315-333.
Rao, KPSB and Rao, B (1983) Theory of charges: a study of finitely additive measures. Academic
Press, New York.
Savage, LJ (1972) The foundations of statistics. Dover Publications, New York.
Schervish, MJ and Seidenfeld, T (1996) A fair minimax theorem for two-person (zero-sum) games
involving finitely additive strategies. In: Berry, D.A., Chaloner, KM, Geweke, JK (Eds.),
Bayesian Analysis in Statistics and Econometrics. Wiley, New York, 557-568.
12
Stinchcombe, MB (2005) Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form
games. Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 332-365.
Vasquez, A (2017) Optimistic equilibria in finitely additive mixed strategies. Preprint.
Wald, A (1945) Generalization of a theorem by v. Neumann concerning zero sum two person
games, Ann. of Math., 2, issue 46, 281-286.
Yanovskaya, EB (1970) The solution of infinite zero-sum two-person games with finitely additive
strategies. Theory of Probability and Its Applications, Vol. 15, No. 1, 153-158.
Yosida, K and Hewitt, E (1952) Finitely additive measures. Transactions of the American Math-
ematical Society, Vol. 72, No. 1, 46-66.
13
